Global South


Comment Search

Always Ready
Please add a “SHARE” button! This stuff is too g...
Always Ready
I don’t want to get so deeply involved in the social m...
Always Ready
It has been about a generation since I read Generations and ...
Moscow on the Rocks
This meeting with Dmitri Simes, Alastair Cooke and Larry Joh...
Mr P
Daily Chronicles
Speaking of Hamas… Comrade M has Qatar/Hamas position ...
Daily Chronicles
Dear Mr P, perhaps this podcast by Judge Napolitano with Max...
Daily Chronicles
In a dusty township graveyard, a line of open graves, before...
Always Ready
This is a discussion from our China Writer’s Group. I...
Daily Chronicles
as a child i was never interested in kites, yet in old age i...
Hamas Official Press Conference
It’s an eschatological war. Uncle Satan, south of the medi...

The Prigogine Mutiny: Intermediate finish

By Rostislav Ishchenko

I didn’t think it would end so quickly. However, Prigozhin’s sudden “complaisance” indicates that far from stupid people were going to become the beneficiaries of this rebellion. As well as the fact that they still have hope (and perhaps they are even sure) that responsibility will be avoided. After all, the formal exposure did not occur.

Why is it an intermediate finish? Because Prigozhin might have thought (and most likely did) that the main organizer of the “march of justice” was himself personally, and that it was his resentment and thirst for revenge that raised and threw an entire army corps (which was his PMCs in terms of numbers and equipment) on Moscow. But 99% for the fact that he was the object of clever manipulation, which involved external forces, some of the Moscow politicians and some people from his entourage.

Of course, theoretically, Prigozhin could also be an equal participant in the transaction. But the risk he was taking was too great, and the bonuses too obscure, to rush headlong into such an adventure, realizing its scale. Even if the coup was successful, it was highly likely to be disposed of.

The owner of a power resource could claim too large a piece when dividing the pie. Therefore, they try to use such people in the dark, instilling in them that the high mission of “saving the people” has fallen on their shoulders. So, for example, the conspirators were going to 18 Brumaire 8 of the year of the Republic (November 9, 1799) secretly use Bonaparte, who was considered a stupid soldier. But Napoleon turned out to be a more experienced politician and outplayed those who planned to play him. Most often, however, if the character providing the external (power) part of the plot is chosen correctly, such a game succeeds.

However, to understand the technique of such a mutiny, it does not matter at all whether Prigogine played an active or passive role in it.

Why am I sure that the mutiny had a huge hidden part (the underwater part of the iceberg)?

The simplest thing is to pay attention to external forces (Ukraine, Poland, the United States), which acted in perfect coordination with the “march of justice”, although they did not maintain real-time communication with its organizers. Such activity would be immediately detected, and even if they could not decipher the conversation, it would serve as excellent public evidence of the leadership of the rebellion from abroad, which, of course, the organizers should have avoided.

Ukraine immediately launched all available forces into a desperate offensive, seeking to crush the Russian army’s battle lines while its main communications (the M4 highway) and main logistics hub (Rostov-on-Don) are controlled by the rebels. You can say as much as you like that “we do not interfere with combat work.” But I won’t even talk about what kind of combat work can be carried out by the officers of the headquarters occupied by the rebels. It is simply foolish to assume that the state authorities (the same Ministry of Defense or the General Staff, and other departments) will send military supplies directly into the hands of the rebels in the hope that they will not use them to increase their own power, but will send them to their intended destination.

That is, the mutiny cut off the logistics of the Russian group (especially under attack from its southern flank) and Kiev took advantage of this. If the Ukrainian massive offensive had started on Monday or Tuesday, it would have been possible to say that the Ukrainians appreciated the situation, saw the chance that had fallen to them by chance, were happy and tried to use it.

But the fact is that the APU was fully prepared for the offensive. Meanwhile, they had just spent three weeks of heavy fighting, their strike group was drained of blood and had to be in the process of rotating. At the same time, the question of continuing the offensive hung up. That is, strategic reserves from the deep should not have been put forward yet. But it turned out that the new strike group had already been assembled and was only waiting for the moment to launch a desperate attack.

Poland and Ukraine in the last weeks before the mutiny conducted suspicious activity in the Belarusian direction. Warsaw has publicly declared the readiness of the Belarusian militants stationed on its territory to launch an invasion with the aim of overthrowing Lukashenka.

I thought that the Poles and Ukrainians had decided to sacrifice their collaborationist cannon fodder for the sake of media effect and strengthening their positions at the upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius, but they clearly knew about the upcoming mutiny and hoped for a real success of the invasion. Russia will be busy suppressing the insurgency and fighting a powerful Ukrainian offensive in the South with logistics cut short. Its reserves will be constrained, and political maneuver will be impossible. it was at this moment that the attack on Belarus was supposed to take place.

The Poles immediately put the army on full alert with the start of the mutiny and waited only for the moment, which, however, did not come for them.

In the US, intelligence has openly admitted that it informed Congress of Prigozhin’s plans. They, however, referred to their own insight: they saw, they say, from satellite that PMCs were increasing their reserves on the old border of the LPR/DPR and Russia, and immediately guessed that Prigozhin was going to storm the Kremlin. In fact, it is clear to everyone that if PMCs are withdrawn from the front to rear camps located in the LPR/DPR, then the reserves go with it. In itself, without any intelligence data, such a move does not mean anything. If, for example, the Pskov division is sent to the barracks for rest, then it will go deep into Russia with all its equipment. It’s not like they’re up to something.

The Americans knew exactly what was going to happen, not because they were so astute, but because they had to keep in touch with the true beneficiaries of the rebellion.

A coup d’etat in Russia with a change in foreign policy made sense only if its organizers were initially confident that they would agree with America and make peace (a failure for Russia, but beneficial for them personally).

So the preliminary arrangements should have been made long before it all started. It is no coincidence that the Ukrainian media, under the sensitive American leadership, helped to mold Prigozhin for at least six months as a Robin Hood, concerned that the rich do not share with the poor, a billionaire (owner of a private army) who dreams of universal equality. By the way, Prigozhin himself only hindered the creation of the image of a “national hero” with his escapades. It also reinforces my belief that it was personally used in the dark.

Now let’s talk about why I am sure that the rebels (those who had contact with the real beneficiaries, and psychologically controlled Prigozhin, instilling in him the right thoughts) counted on support in Moscow.

With Putin’s 86-90% support, there was no hope of attracting the masses to his side and a spontaneous transition of the security forces. This means that all the problems had to be solved by a corps of 20-25 thousand people (in fact, less, since it was necessary to make a discount on “shrinkage/utruska” – never a part or unit joins the mutiny in full, from 10% to 50-60% remain neutral-formally loyal to the authorities). That is, in reality, the rebels could count on 15-20 thousand people. But we will even give them a head start and will operate with the number of 25 thousand.

With such a military force, you can expect to reach Moscow in a day or two and even break into the capital. We don’t have a division stationed in every village. Most of the best-trained troops at the front, a large group in Belarus, another in Kaliningrad, the next near St. Petersburg, a group in Karelia is being strengthened, and it is necessary to cover the polar possessions and the Far East. In general, there are no extra troops to keep at hand (between Moscow, Voronezh and Rostov-on-Don). Even if there are formations of the emerging reserve army somewhere, then un-shot volunteers and conscripts, seasoned fighters should have been knocked out of their positions without any special problems, and there was simply no time to transfer troops, even at the cost of exposing the front.

But then the question arose. Well, they broke in, but what to do next? A city of one and a half dozen million people, a city larger in scale than other European countries, with a garrison of 25 thousand, is simply impossible to control. The authorities, even in the worst case scenario, can always move to the reserve command post, slowly pull up troops, block the rebels in several quarters that they are really capable of defending and, if they do not surrender, wipe them off the face of the earth.

1 Comment
Inline Feedbacks
View all comments

5 months ago

That mutiny did never existed because was Putin’s move to conceal the arrival of nuclear weapons to Belarus. Now, it’s clear that Wagner will not longer exist there are more than 30 groups under control of MoD